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Abstract. The legal concept and the doctrinal theory of state responsibility and liability have 
been in the focus of public international law for a long while. By means of domestic legis-
lation, national law–regardless of the relevance of the international legal framework–governs 
the system of civil liability within the area of civil law of each state. Whereas, as opposed to 
the framework of civil liability governed by diverse domestic rules, exclusively a standard 
regulation framed at an inter-state level can secure a uniform system of state liability. The issue 
of state responsibility for nuclear damages raises specific questions to be examined in the 
framework of general international regulations (e.g., Conventions adopted within the area of 
nuclear law) related to responsibility and liability. Thus, answering or the clarification of these 
specific pivotal questions within the scope of public international law shall be our starting 
point, which may also entail the modification of the matter of state responsibility and liability 
(not only in the concerned branch of law).  
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The Issue of State Responsibility in the Practice  
of the International Law Commission   
 
The concept of state responsibility and liability1 had formerly been considered 
by the international (academic) community, when, as a result of the efforts made 
by various forums of international policy-makers and actors,2 the International 
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 1 As for the traditional, brief history of ‘state responsibility’, cf. Bodansky, D.–Crook, 
J. R.: Symposium: the ILC’s State Responsibility Articles. American Journal of International 
Law 96 (2002), 773–779. 
 2 E.g. the substantial discussion in the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly, 
written comments by a number of Governments, as well as by a study of the International 
Law Association. Cf. Fourth Report on State Responsibility. Para. 1. 
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Law Commission (hereinafter: ILC) adopted a quasi-treaty text3 designated as 
ILC’s Draft Articles on the issue of state responsibility.4 It is the very general 
and legally non-binding character of ILC’s Draft Articles (regarding that these 
articles have not yet been materialised in the form of a convention or any inter-
national legal document) that accounts for the fact that in research work, ILC’s 
Draft Articles have been ignored, nevertheless, we should take them into 
account as a communis opinio doctorum and as a summary containing the 
main theoretical concepts of state responsibility, which need to manifest 
themselves either in international customary law or in international state 
practices, or, in both of these. Thus, it is deemed essential that the provisions 
of the ILC’s Draft Articles are surveyed and analysed in view of the concerned 
legal area parallelly to nuclear legal conventions, on the one hand, if the 
regulation of issues of state responsibility and liability lacks instruments of 
nuclear law, or, on the other hand, the governing regulation would not be able 
to encompass all relevant aspects of the aforementioned responsibility and 
liability under the framework of nuclear law. 
 In general, the ILC adopted the traditional state-to-state approach5 irrespec-
tive of the increasingly emerging question of the responsibility of non-state 
actors, such as terrorist groups and individuals. A key question in this respect 
is whether under international law a state is responsible for damages or injuries 
incurred to another state and, if so, to what extent it bears international respon-
  
 3 As for the proof of this phrase, ILC annexed lengthy and comprehensive commentaries 
and the draft had been made in the dominant working style of the ILC, so these articles 
“had the look and feel of a treaty.” See Caron, D.: The ILC Articles on State Responsibility: 
The Paradoxical Relationship Between Form and Authority, American Journal of Inter-
national Law 96 (2002), 861–862. But the draft does not recommend to the General 
Assembly that the articles be considered for adoption as a treaty. See ibid. On the 
theoretical approaches of its form, see ibid. 862–866. The Resolution 56/83 (December 12, 
2001) adopted by the General Assembly commends the articles to the “attention of Govern-
ments without prejudice to the question of their future adoption or other appropriate 
action.” See Point 3 of the GA Res. 56/83. 
 4 About the draft, see particularly Crawford, J.: The International Law Commission’s 
Articles on State Responsibility, Introduction, Text and Commentaries. Cambridge, 2002. 
381. Following the ILC’s Draft Articles, a diplomatic conference has not been convened by 
the UN General Assembly to create a treaty on the basis of the ILC’s Draft Articles. That 
was the reason for being legally non-binding instrument. At this stage, it shall have been 
emphasized that the ILC’s Draft Articles exclusively uses the term ‘responsibility’ or 
‘responsible’ even if the use of ‘liability’ or ‘liable’ would be expedient in such cases for 
avoiding the possible problems arising from this legally non-precise usage. 
 5 Cf. Weiss, E. B.: Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-first Century. American 
Journal of International Law 96 (2002), 798.  
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sibility for its actions.6 Generally, under public international law, if an act of 
any state has been wilfully and maliciously committed, or that act would has 
been committed in a gravely negligent manner and implies a breach of an inter-
national obligation, these facts (causal relation between cause and the result of 
a conduct imputable to the state as damage or harm7) would entail that state 
responsibility obtains, therefore, compensation and reparations shall supervene 
pursuant to the legal regulation of state liability.8 So, firstly, the term and 
meaning of state responsibility shall be distinguished from state liability by 
means of exact concept-formation in the general area of international law (lex 
generalis) and specifically, under nuclear law (lex specialis). 
 The codification process conducted by ILC was frequently self-contradic-
tory by reason of the departing legal thinking of the five rapporteurs, scilicet, 
their different conceptions deriving from their diverse backgrounds as to state 
establishments and legal systems. Therefore, in the domain of the problematic 
distinction to be made between state responsibility and liability debates often 
flared up, which basically influenced the fundamental approach of this subject-
matter (see, particularly Riphagen’s thoughts concerning this dilemma9). The 
final draft unambiguously contains only rules concerning state responsibility 
because of the “state’s responsibility for internationally wrongful acts” phrase, 
which means that the draft precluded the possibility of raising liability-issues 
upon the interpretation of the articles, since it used the phrase of “wrongful 
act”. The term of “responsibility” postulates the wrongful act of a state,10 while 
the term of  “liability” for injuries is attached to lawful acts. For this reason, it 
is generally accepted that the codification of state liability would have been the 
subject of a separate ILC work.  
  
 6 See Jabbari-Gharabagh, M.: Type of State Responsibility for Environmental Matters 
in International Law. Revue juridique Thémis (1999) 63. 
 7 See Article 2 of the Draft Articles. 
 8 As an international customary norm, the Permanent Court of International Justice 
stated „it is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement involves an 
obligation to make reparation in an adequate form.” See Chorzów Factory Judgment, No. 
8 (1927) 21.    
 9 See Bodansky–Crook: op. cit. 778. 
 10 ILC’s Draft Articles state a logical equation: conduct not in conformity with an 
international obligation and attributable to a state equals an internationally wrongful act 
resulting in state responsibility. See Bodansky–Crook: op. cit. 782. Cf. Article 12 of the 
ILC’s Draft Articles. 
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 Another cardinal problem is also deemed of considerable importance. Ago 
distinguished “secondary” rules from “primary” rules of obligation.11 This 
scheme was taken over by Crawford apart from the fact that ILC had not 
decided to emphasize the primary rules, furthermore, it declared that “state 
responsibility should be dealt with within the purview of secondary rules.”12 
 
 
1. State Responsibility in General 
 
The international responsibility of a state manifests an ‘objective’ character, 
“in the absence of any specific requirement of a mental element in terms of 
primary obligation, it is only the act of a State that matters, independently of 
any intention” – pursuant to the ILC.13  
 The exact distinction between the notions of responsibility and liability 
implies two different approaches to the same problem.14 In the following, for 
the purpose of the differentiation of the dual meaning by means of a semantic 
overview,15 the terms of responsibility and liability must be clearly circumscribed. 
Nevertheless, these terms are sometimes applied without discretion to questions 
of liability or responsibility in manners, which indicate that the occurrence of 
damages or losses is not a sufficient or even a necessary basis for respon-
sibility.16 
 According to the strict viewpoint of international law, however, liability 
and responsibility obtains, when a breach of an obligation laid down under 
  
 11 Secondary rules determine the legal consequences arising out of failure to perform 
obligations set forth in the primary rules. Cf. Yearbook of the International Law Commission. 
New York, 1 (1974) 5. 
 12 Cf. Yearbook of the International Law Commission. United Nations, New York, 1 
(2001) 106. 
 13 Cf. ibid. 249. 
 14 But the traditional principles of state responsibility could merge with the concept of 
state liability, particularly in instances such as ultra-hazardous activities where states must 
meet such a strict standard of care that for all practical purposes they will be responsible 
(and so, liable) for any activity leading to harm. Cf. Hunter, D.–Sommer, J.–Vaughan, S.: 
United Nations Environment Programme. Concepts and Principles of International Law: 
An Introduction. New York, 1994. 
 15 Cf. Horbach, N.: The Confusion about State Responsibility and Liability, Leiden 
Journal of International Law, 4 (1991) 47–74. English and German–opposed to the French 
(responsabilité) and Hungarian (felelősség)–language draw a distinctive word-form between 
the two notions (responsibility and liability–Haftung and Verantwortlichkeit). 
 16 See Fourth Report on State responsibility. Para. 30. 
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international law has occurred, which per se does not need to involve the 
requirement of the element of either negligence or malice.17 
 As for the standpoint of ILC, as it is manifest in the legally non-binding 
draft in the abstract, every internationally wrongful act of a state entails the 
international responsibility of that state (according to Article 1 of ILC’s Draft 
Articles). On the other hand, the term of “state liability” does not necessitate 
that the facts of the case of an internationally wrongful act of a state obtains. 
Subsequently, every act of a specific state, regardless of its possible legal 
grounds, can effectuate the liability of the state irrespective of the fact whether it 
has caused transboundary damages.18 
 The international responsibility of a state implies its duty to make reparations 
for the damages, which result from a failure to comply with its international 
obligations–as it was everlastingly drafted in the 1930 Hague Conference on 
State Responsibility (and has prevailed thence). The term ‘responsibility’ was 
based upon the general rule of international law that states are legally 
accountable for breaching international obligations imposed on them. Former 
determination refers to the so-called ‘primary obligation’ under international 
law, which is formulated under Article 1 of ILC’s Draft Articles as follows: 
 
“Every internationally wrongful act of a state entails the international 
responsibility of the state.”19 
 
Consequently, the rules of state responsibility stipulate and determine whether 
international obligations have been breached,20 moreover, an internationally 
  
 17 In the early literature, Hardy regarded that fault-based liability had been always 
required in opposition to the argumentation that state had automatically incurred respon-
sibility for whatever it had been done, so it appeared preferable to say that liability is in all 
cases to be determined by international law – or rather according to the legal literature of 
the 50’s and 60’s. Cf. Hardy, M.: International Protection against Nuclear Risks. Inter-
national and Comparative Law Quarterly 10 (1961) 755. 
 18 As for de la Fayette’s position, she thought that ‘responsibility’ is to prevent damage 
(to take care of control of a person, thing, installation, activity), while ‘liability’ almost 
exclusively concentrates for compensating the victims (obligation to repair the damage or 
to compensate the innocent victim). See de la Fayette, L.: Towards a New Regime of State 
Responsibility for Nuclear Activities. Nuclear Law Bulletinc 50 (1992) 21. 
 19 As for the imperative conditions of ‘internationally wrongful act’, cf. Article 2 of the 
Draft Articles. 
 20 Breach of an international obligation is defined as “an act (...) not in conformity with 
what is required (...) by that obligation”–as the ILC’s Draft Articles state. See Crawford: op. 
cit. Note 1, Article 12. The breach of an international obligation entails two types of legal 
consequences. Firstly, it creates new obligations for the breaching state, principally, duties 
226 GÁBOR KECSKÉS 
  
wrongful act entailing state responsibility through the breach of an obligation 
has to be followed by sanctions (such as restitution, reparation, compensation, 
therefore, as to the ensuant consequences, no relevant difference between the 
notions of responsibility and liability obtains). 
 Traditional principles of state responsibility may merge with state liability 
that arises from lawful acts, particularly in instances such as ultra-hazardous 
activities, in the case of which states need to proceed with such a strict 
standard of care that for all practical purposes they will be “responsible” for 
any activity leading to (transboundary) harm.21  
 
 
2. State Responsibility in the Area of Nuclear Law  
 
Under international law, states are responsible for damages arising from the 
nuclear installations operating under their authority or control, because the 
absolute liable operator22 does not function independently of governmental 
control.23 
 Generally, as it has been expressly pointed in the foregoing out, the concept 
of responsibility in both branches of nuclear law and of environmental law 
derives from unlawful acts, principally from an intentional international breach 
of obligation. So, the applicability of the term of ‘state responsibility’ requires 
the effective breach of obligation by states, whereupon a nuclear accident or 
radiological emergency occurs and the damages and losses are ascertainably 
the results of breaching obligations (direct causality is necessary between the 
breach, as a cause and the damage, as an effect). As an outcome of this 
statement, state responsibility shall entail an obligation for the wrongdoing 
state to make full reparation24 for the internationally wrongful act in the form 
of restitution,25 compensation26 and satisfaction.27  
                                                      
of cessation and non-repetition (cf. Article 30 of the ILC’s Draft Articles) and secondly, a 
duty to make full reparation (cf. Article 31 of the ILC’s Draft Articles). 
 21 See Hunter, D.–Sommer, J.–Vaughan, S.: Concepts and Principles of International 
Law: An Introduction. New York, 1996. 
 22 The notion of ‘operator’ incorporates the licensee or other designated or recognized 
entity. The duty of designation or recognition is within the competence of the national 
government or the legislator body. 
 23 See de la Fayette: op. cit. 18. 
 24 Cf. Article 31 of the ILC’s Draft Articles. 
 25 Cf. ibid. Article 35. 
 26 Cf. ibid. Article 36. 
 27 Cf. ibid. Article 37. 
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 Article 34 of ILC’s Draft Articles reads as follows: 
 
“Full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act 
shall take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either 
singly or in combination, in accordance with the provisions of this 
(Reparation for injury under Chapter II–the author) Chapter.”28 
 
 In the area of nuclear law, the issue of state responsibility for nuclear 
damages and for breaching obligations remains in the background compared to 
the concept of state liability. Its reasons are multifarious. 
 Firstly, nuclear accidents and radiological emergencies with transboundary 
effects are not direct consequences of breaching obligations committed 
intentionally by states on the whole (e.g., 1986 Chernobyl disaster).  
 Secondly, in addition to the previous paragraph, the damages and losses 
including the loss of human life and huge amounts of damages prevent the 
states from breaching obligations framed by international instruments. As a 
rule, the financial consequences (determined under conventions and other 
instruments) of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency caused by a state 
by breaching an obligation are severe for states. It is also for that reason that 
the relevance of state responsibility falls behind the relevance of state liability, 
when the cause of contingent damages is a lawful act as a rule.  
 Thirdly, ‘liability’ is classified (fault-based, strict or absolute, exclusive, 
vicarious, residual, etc.) with regard to the extent of the negligence of a state 
that effected damages. In the case of state responsibility, similar distinction 
cannot be made, since a state either committed or did not commit an inter-
nationally wrongful act that substantiate claims for reparation. In the latter 
case, the state shall not be responsible for its action. 
 Finally, while ‘liability’ is circumscribed within a refined system defined at 
an international level (such as the Paris and Vienna Conventions on liability, 
etc.), the circumscription of ‘responsibility’ has been accomplished in a scattered 
manner in various separate international instruments. These instruments will be 
discussed in the following. 
 
  
 28 But it could be far from easy to hold another state effectively responsible for a breach 
of a norm of international (environmental) law. Consequently, the injured state has the 
burden of proof that the responsible state has breached an international obligation.  
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2.1. The appearance of the term of ‘state responsibility’ under several 
  significant documents of nuclear law 
 
The international community followed the evolution of the concept of and rules 
pertaining to ‘state responsibility’ within the area of nuclear law for a long time. 
Nevertheless, no document of the special sub-systems within the framework of 
nuclear law contains a specific and legally binding regulation of the special 
nuclear (and general) responsibility of states that distinguishes cases of respon-
sibility from these of liability. 
 In general, we need to point out that in the area of nuclear law the state has 
primary responsibility for emergency preparedness in the event when radio-
active materials are not under the control of the entity in charge, but, for 
example, they disappear or are abandoned in the state illicitly. 
 The tragedy at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in 1986 motivated the 
entire international nuclear community to provide for guarantees that countries 
would be well prepared in the future to manage (by means of the establishment 
of standard emergency preparedness and post-emergency management 
programmes) the physical, psychological and financial consequences of severe 
nuclear accidents. Therefore, it was the Chernobyl accident of 1986 that 
aroused the international community and the legislative organs, hence the 
regulation process, which also encompassed the definition of the concept of 
state responsibility in re the horrific transboundary effects of that “milestone 
accident”, uniformly commenced. It was recognised that civil responsibility 
(liability) per se cannot prevent or remedy the humanitarian and environmental 
consequences of nuclear damages.29  
 The first signs of this change in the approach were the reconsideration and 
revision of the effective legal framework, mainly in the area of liability, which 
we will discuss later. Other impulses also referred to the necessity of the adoption 
of new regulations in specific areas that were highlighted by the mournful 
experiences of the Chernobyl accident.30 The new regulations were designated 
  
 29 Pursuant to Xue Hanqin’s opinion, the effect of the Chernobyl accident was the 
discrepancy between theory and practice that raised several questions, e.g. what kind of 
responsibility a state should bear under international law to prevent and remedy damage 
caused to other states. On further questions with attributed relevance by Hanqin, cf. Hanqin, X.: 
Transboundary Damage in International Law. Cambridge, 2003. 2. 
 30 Strictly speaking, these intentions were not the very first endeavours occurred within 
international and national level. Following the 1979 Three Mile Islands accident, there was 
a need to create a framework for reporting and mutual assistance in nuclear accidents. But 
the real breakthrough had been practically succeeded after 1986 Chernobyl accident. Cf. 
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to remedy the defects in significant rules pertaining to the areas noticeably 
concerned in the accident.31  
 The appearance of the term of ‘state responsibility’ (in the concerned 
conventions under nuclear law discussed thereinafter) indicates that the respective 
obligations of states deriving from the conventions were defined with respect 
to their differing character. 
 
2.1.1. The concept of state responsibility under the Convention of 1986 on 
Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and under the Convention of 1986 on 
Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency  
 
These instruments were adopted in response to the Chernobyl accident in 1986, 
so that they required the contracting states to notify early and immediately the 
potentially affected states and IAEA about the accident, which needs to be 
followed by assistance on the part of the installation state or of the responsible 
state. The new global recognition of nuclear danger (an accident somewhere is 
an accident everywhere) motivated the states to establish obligations under two 
separate conventions concerning prompt and necessary arrangements in the 
event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency. 
 Upon the consideration of these documents, it can be clearly stated that 
the problem of state responsibility is crucial in their scope of application. The 
requirements of notification and assistance are primarily not typical issues of 
liability, however, these dual obligations have de facto relevance in re re-
sponsibility under nuclear law. Actually, damages and losses may arise from 
the breach of the obligations of notification32 and assistance,33 which shall 
                                                      
ElBaradei, M.–Nwogugu, E.–Rames, J.: International Law and Nuclear Energy: Overview 
of the legal framework. IAEA Bulletin 37 (1995) 16–25. 
 31 Cf. Schwartz, J.: Emergency Preparedness and Response: Compensating Victims of 
a Nuclear Accident. Journal of Hazardous Materials 111 (2004) 89. 
 32 Article 2 of the Early Notification Convention establishes the obligation in respect of 
the notification and information. According to the Article 2, in the event of a nuclear 
accident, the state referred to in that article shall forthwith notify, directly or though the 
IAEA, those States which are or may be physically affected and the Agency of the nuclear 
accident, its nature, the time of its occurrence and its exact location where appropriate. 
Furthermore, it promptly provides the states, directly or through the IAEA, and the IAEA 
with such available information relevant to minimizing the radiological consequences in 
the states. 
 33 Paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the Assistance Convention provides general provisions 
(no legal obligations) for states to cooperate between themselves and with the IAEA in 
accordance with the provisions of the convention to facilitate prompt assistance in the 
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establish the responsibility and liability of the respective state for compensa-
tion to victims of another state, in which damages and losses are unambiguous 
consequences of the failure to comply with the dual aforementioned obliga-
tions (as an issue of liability). On the other hand, we need to emphasise the 
issue of responsibility in the scope of the following argumentation. 
 The obligation of notification under the Early Notification Convention is 
irrespective of the damages and losses caused by the accident or emergency in 
the event of the omission of notification. Thus, a breach of an obligation (or 
obligations) on the part of a state can be established, if the facts of the case of 
an omission (regardless of its cause, such as unintentional negligence or inten-
tional character) obtain, therefore, that act shall qualify as a wrongful and 
intentional act of a state, which shall entail the international responsibility of 
a state. In that case, other aftermaths, such as damages, financial consequences 
and pecuniary losses, which are essential for the establishment of liability, have 
been disregarded.  
 Merely one requirement may tinge the notification obligation, which 
further defines the applicability of the responsibility of a state, namely, the 
information to be provided pursuant to Article 2 shall contain determined data 
as concurrently available to the notifying state.34 
 
As for the Assistance Convention, the main provisions and conditions are akin 
to the rules delineated above in the discussion of the relevant rules of the Early 
Notification Convention. The definition of state responsibility is designated to 
provide an international framework for the comprehensive direction, control, co-
ordination and supervision of the assistance35 and for the promotion of prompt 
assistance by states and IAEA in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological 
emergency.  
 However, the Assistance Convention clearly differs from the Early Notifi-
cation Convention, so far as Articles 1 and 2 of the Assistance Convention 
substantiate no legal obligation, since the objective of the Assistance Convention 
is merely the establishment of a framework for the facilitation of the provision 
of assistance by a state to another state (which accounts for a lack of state 
responsibility in re concrete, specific assistance mechanisms). Therefore, the 
Assistance Convention is also a framework agreement designed to establish 
                                                      
event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency to minimize its consequences and to 
protect life, property and the environment from the effects of radioactive releases.  
 34 On the detailed enumeration, cf. Article 5 of Early Notification Convention.  
 35 Cf. Article 3 (a) of the Assistance Convention.  
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a general basis for mutual assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or 
radiological emergency.  
 As opposed to the Early Notification Convention, the Assistance Conven-
tion applies the term of ‘responsibility’. It expressly stipulates that the direction 
and control of assistance are the duties (the relevant responsibility) of the state 
concerned, since in the absence of that rule, the international responsibility of a 
state could not be established. 
 
2.1.2. The concept of state responsibility under the Convention of 1994 
on Nuclear Safety 
 
The Convention of 1994 is considerably general so far as the issue of respon-
sibility is concerned. In accordance with its purpose, its provisions are neither 
peremptory, nor sanctioning, but typically incentive (quoting the reviews under 
its effect), which may complicate and supersede the regulation of issues related 
to responsibility. For that reason, issues of the responsibility of states are 
closely and strictly attached to the breach of basic obligations regulated under 
Articles 4 and 5.  
 As opposed to the missing conception of state responsibility, the concept of 
the responsibility of the license holder is defined under the Convention, so that 
the unambiguous duty of the license holder is established, since it has primary 
responsibility for the safety of the nuclear installation under Article 9.  
 As Paragraph 2 of Article 21 stipulates: 
 
“If there is no such licence holder or other responsible party, the 
responsibility rests with the Contracting Party which has jurisdiction over 
the spent fuel or over the radioactive waste.”  
 
 Accordingly, states have subsidiary responsibility overshadowed by the 
primary responsibility of the license holder. Such a definition of the responsibility 
of states has been influenced by the general attitude of states supported by the 
following rule: “whoever was responsible for the generation of the waste should 
bear the responsibility for its disposal.” 
 Therefore, ‘responsibility’ under nuclear law is construed as a relevant, but 
subsidiary attribute of the state. Relevant, because during the previous decades, 
states have recognized that they bear responsibility at an international level 
and have concluded international agreements on supplementary compensation, 
if the means of the operator are exhausted. 
 The primary elements underlying state responsibility have been principally 
codified in the area of international environmental law related to transboundary 
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damages caused by states. In my view, and let me refer to the subject-matter of 
the present study, the damages deriving from the breach of a concrete 
instrument of environmental law and the injurious effects of nuclear accidents 
or radiological emergency correlate. Strictly speaking, the same criteria prevail 
in both areas. 
 Generally, for the establishment of the responsibility of a state, four basic 
elements need to be available. Thus, if the following criteria are uniformly 
attained in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency causing 
damages and losses, the state shall be responsible for their transboundary 
effects, which supervene in the territory of another state. All of the following 
criteria should be construed in line with the general rules of public inter-
national law and with the legally non-binding rules of ILC’s Draft Articles. 
 Criterion 1: Transboundary environmental damages or losses must result 
from a violation of international (nuclear) legal instruments.36 The damages 
or losses must be direct consequences of a nuclear accident or radiological 
emergency. Accordingly, the causality between the accident or emergency (cause) 
and the damages or losses (effect) can be established. External influences are 
not admitted to interfere so that the responsibility of a state can be applicable. 
 Criterion 2: A state is responsible both for its respective activities and for 
the activities of private corporations or individuals under its authority or control. 
Thus, even if a state is not polluting directly, the state can still be held 
responsible for the failure to stop or control pollution by other entities. 
According to this rule, states may be held responsible for the failure to enact or 
enforce the necessary environmental law, to terminate dangerous activities, or, 
to sanction violations. 
 Criterion 3: No justifying circumstances are admitted, such as consent by 
the affected state or an intervening cause, such as an act of God (vis major or 
force majeure). That criterion is not so relevant under nuclear law, because of 
the extreme contingency of damages, so the affectedness of a state in whose 
territory the transboundary effects appear is a considerably rare status quo (and 
that kind of affliction is scarcely ever intentional).37 
 Criterion 4: Damages must be “significant”, which may entail serious problems 
of proof and quantification. In the area of nuclear law, damages may affect 
individuals, property and the environment in several states. Damages caused by 
radiation may not be immediately and easily recognised. Furthermore, even at 
  
 36 Cf. the provisions of Article 1 of the ILC’s Draft Articles. See further Crawford: op. 
cit. 77–80. 
 37 Cf. the provisions of Article 10, Article 16–18, Article 20 and Article 23 of the ILC 
Draft Articles. See further Crawford: op. cit. 116–120, 148–158, 163–165 and 170–173. 
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nuclear power plants, at which the highest safety standard has been guaranteed, 
the occurrence of nuclear and radiological accidents cannot be completely 
excluded. That constitutes the unique feature of transboundary effects caused 
by nuclear accidents or radiological emergency. 
 The term ‘state responsibility’ appears in a significant but subsidiary way 
within the nuclear scope. Significant, because in the previous decades, states 
have recognized that they carry responsibility at international level too, and 
have also concluded international agreements on supplementary compensation 
if the means of the operator are exhausted.38 
 
 
3. State Liability in a General Context 
 
The term of ‘liability’ is applied in cases where damage or loss was incurred as 
a result of an activity that had been conducted neither in breach of an inter-
national obligation, nor in breach of the states’ due diligence obligations (lawful 
act that involves risks and transboundary damage39). ILC’s Draft Articles 
clarify the uncertainties persisting in connection with the existence of a breach 
of an international obligation. Article 12 reads as follows: 
 
“There is a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act 
of that State is not in conformity with what is required of it by that 
obligation, regardless of its origin or character.” 
 
 As ILC’s codification work clearly demonstrates, a State can be liable even 
for acts that are perfectly lawful, but in the event of injurious consequences, 
they can entail liability.40 As opposed to State responsibility, which arises 
exclusively from acts prohibited by international law, the facts of the matter of 
the international liability of a State may arise from both lawful and unlawful 
acts.  
 The main distinctive characteristics, which are markedly separated in 
pursuance of the delimitation of the concept and content of these regimes, 
consist in the followings:  
  
 38 See Pelzer, N.: Modernizing the International Regime Governing Nuclear Third 
Party Liability. Montpellier, 2007. 10. 
 39 The ILC’s activities and the Draft Articles within this field published under the title 
of “International liability for injurious consequences arising from out of acts not 
prohibited by international law”. 
 40 Cf. Yearbook of the International Law Commission. New York, 1980. 246. 
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 a) In a general context, the term of ‘responsibility’ encompasses the omission 
of acts that cause damage attributable to a State under international law 
and these acts (or omissions) constitute severe breaches of obligations. 
 b) State liability entails adequate compensation for damage suffered by 
victims (liability for pecuniary compensation obtains, even if inadequate 
resources for compensation are available at the operator’s disposal). 
Rules of State liability for harmful and transboundary consequences of 
e.g. nuclear activities are construed in a broad scope in comparison with 
the restricted field of State responsibility.  
 Accordingly, rules of liability for acts not prohibited by international law 
are irrespective of whether the activity was faulty or lawful, they emphasise 
the harm, rather than the conduct.  
 
 
4. State Liability in the Area of Nuclear Law 
 
In a general scope, pursuant to various documents of international law including 
Conventions, State liability establishes a legal relationship between the State 
as perpetrator of the internationally wrongful act and the injured State(s). 
 During the debates and the legislation process within the framework of the 
Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly in the 1990s, several possible 
options were dealt with in the work of the Committee based upon the idea that 
liability ensues from significant transboundary harm and gives rise to liability 
for reparation.41 It was generally acknowledged that the residual liability of the 
State was essential in situations in which the primarily liable operators did not 
have sufficient financial resources to provide adequate compensation to the 
victims of injuries caused by transboundary damages.42 The range of various 
classes of liability specified in the Committee’s position was different from the 
customary classification of the fault-based, strict, exclusive liability in 
pertinent Conventions and legal history. Absolute liability and the channelled 
liability of (a) State(s) were extinguished, since they were only applicable in 
the regime of civil liability, where exclusively the operator was responsible 
for activities causing transboundary effects, including nuclear accidents or 
radiological emergency for the duration of the operator’s control over those 
  
 41 See International Liability for Injurious Consequences arising out of Acts Not 
Prohibited By International Law. at http://www.un.org/law/1990–1999/. 
 42 See James Baxter’s position from the Sixth Committee, Press Release GA/L/2871 
20th Meeting (PM) 20 October 1995. 7. 
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activities.43 According to the objectives of ILC, residual (subsidiary) and joint 
or multiple liability shall govern the regime in which States compensate victims 
not satisfied by the operator (after the exploitation of the insufficient subsidiary 
compensation fund) on the basis that the State concerned has failed to meet its 
obligations and a causal relation between that failure and the damage caused 
obtains.44  
 Providing compensation for victims on a residual basis was considered, 
since States are deemed liable to remedy the defects of a civil liability regime 
according to the specific restrictions related to the tiers of compensation. The 
required compensation should be raised from public funds, when the claim 
for damages resulting in the operator’s liability would not be covered by the 
available amount for the ensuant damages and losses, therefore, the requirement 
of compensation would not be met. When the liability of the operator had been 
legally exclusive and absolute, the real and effective guarantees to pay compen-
sation for damages were missing from legal instruments related to the operator’s 
liability within the regime of civil liability. In response to that problem and 
contradiction prevailing formerly, the concept of State liability was formulated. 
 In the scope of the basic principles of liability related to nuclear energy, the 
explicit expression of State liability has not been formulated. Nevertheless, 
relevant steps have been taken to frame the liability of States within the scope 
of obligations. E.g., the 1963 Brussels Supplementary Convention was adopted 
for the admission of the provision of supplementary compensation from public 
funds. This measure exceeded the scope of the regulation of civil liability and 
foreshadowed further support and compensation to be secured by States. 
Consequently, it can easily supervene that a State is not legally liable for the 
damage, but as opposed to this unambiguous fact, it has the duty to 
compensate the victims through its public funds and resources regardless of the 
fact whether it carried out activities that could cause damages. At that time, the 
term of ‘State liability’ was not introduced during the discussions, which 
impeded the appearance and evolution of this notion. 
 Nevertheless, during the previous decades (especially in the 1990s) a change 
of approach supervened, since the term of ‘State liability’ was incorporated into 
pivotal provisions of the Conventions. The 1997 Vienna Convention and the 
1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation were the sequels of the 
recognition that in the event of nuclear accidents and radiological emergency 
  
 43 Cf. International Liability for Injurious Consequences arising out of Acts Not 
Prohibited By International Law. at http://www.un.org/law/1990–1999/. 
 44 See in details Yearbook of the International Law Commission. 1994, Vol. II. 155–
158. 
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international State liability obtains, furthermore, it was frequently alluded to in 
the context of the international civil liability regime.45 
 Finally, the last relevant amendment related to the liability regime based 
upon the Paris and Vienna Conventions was adopted in 2004. The Contracting 
Parties signed the Amending Protocols in order to ensure that the Paris Conven-
tion was more in accordance with the Conventions amended or adopted in 
1997 under the auspices of the IAEA. The main objective of the 1997 Protocol 
to Amend the Vienna Convention was the intention of the provision of more 
compensation to more victims in the event of a nuclear accident with a graver 
effect than the one as conceptualised in the original and later amended regime. 
Thereby, the mechanism and the procedure were still in effect, but the defini-
tion, the measures and the requirements of effectiveness changed (including 
the amount of compensation), which were the most serious steps taken as to 
purposes, which was to provide the world community with the opportunity to 
deal legal liability and compensation for nuclear damage through a free-
standing global regime.  
 
4.1. Role and relevance of the Price-Anderson Act in the field of nuclear  
  energy  
  
The epoch-making Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act (hereinafter: 
Price-Anderson Act or Act) constitutes federal law in the United States (passed 
in 1957 by the Congress pursuant to Chapter 8 of the U.S. Constitution 
amended several times, last time in 2005 for a 25-year-period), which has been 
governing liability issues in re non-military nuclear facilities in the territory of 
the United States. 
 This national (federal), legally binding law (the first comprehensive nuclear 
liability law in the world adopted by domestic legislation) preceded later 
Conventions46 on nuclear liability and was declared47 to have promoted the 
establishment of a unique private insurance scheme48 and the indemnity of the 
U.S. Government (that demonstrates the dichotomy of civil and State liability) 
  
 45 Cf. The 1997 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the 
1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage–Explanatory Texts. 
IAEA International Law Series No. 3, Vienna, 2007. 18. 
 46 Cf. The so-called “grandfather clause” in the Article 2 of the Annex attached to the 
1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage. 
 47 As to proof of this statement, see the U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusions in the case 
of Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59  (1978). 
 48 See in details Quattrocchi, J.: Nuclear Liability Insurance in the United States: An 
Insurer’s Perspectives. In: Reform of Civil Nuclear Liability. Budapest, 1999. 383–398. 
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in order to compensate the persons who had been injured in nuclear accidents 
within or outside the United States. 
 American literature on law almost uniformly state that this norm aimed to 
create the so-called vicarious liability of the State (the indemnity of the U.S. 
Government for nuclear liability parallelled by the system of private insurance), 
whilst pursuant to the Act, in the event of a major accident, all nuclear 
facilities would be required to contribute, irrespective of the place where the 
accident occurred. If certain operators would decline to contribute, the State 
would intervene to ensure that financial resources would be made available.49 
On the score of the Act, its purpose is to provide coverage for “anyone liable” 
and for “any legal liability arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident”, 
but the burden of proof lies with the claimant.50 The Congress of the United 
States supported the idea that an international fund will be set up with the 
exclusive objective of compensation for transboundary damages and losses.51  
 The Act based on an insurance scheme (not fault-based as within system of 
the Common Law) establishes a system in which the payment of 10 billion 
USD shall be subject to the liability of the industries (operator) as opposed to 
the basic civil liability approach. Any claims exceeding the limit of 10 billion 
USD shall be covered by the U.S. federal Government, specifically, by the 
Energy Department (accordingly, vicarious liability figures as a type of State 
liability).52 In the event of a nuclear accident causing damages in excess of the 
limits of the Act, the U.S. Congress shall take further actions, e.g., insurance of 
appropriate funds. U.S. nuclear companies, nuclear industries are relieved of 
any liability beyond the limit of the amount of indemnity for any nuclear 
accident, including radiation or radioactive releases, regardless of fault or 
cause and causality.  
 By the adoption of the Price-Anderson Act with the annexed amendments, 
the U.S. Congress encouraged private participation (private insurance companies, 
operators) in the field of nuclear energy, while it also provided compensation 
from public funds (Federal, State liability).  
 If we accept the aforesaid opinion on the initially and basically challenged, 
controversial, dual-faced mechanism, the Price-Anderson Act could serve as a 
model for the endeavours of regulation not only on a national, but also on an 
  
 49 See Reform of Civil Nuclear Liability… op. cit. 220. 
 50 This is the so-called “omnibus” feature of the U.S. system based upon Price-Anderson 
Act what is often referred to as “economic channelling of liability” instead of the term 
“legal channelling”. 
 51 See Reform of Civil Nuclear Liability… op. cit. 221. 
 52 Cf. ibid. 252–253. 
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international level. But this dual-faced mechanism has not completely attained 
its purpose, because of the unwillingness of taking federal financial measures, 
consequently, the traditional civil liability regime has persisted and prevailed. 
De la Fayette pointed out the contradictory situation: “although, the U.S. is a 
strong opponent of State liability for transboundary nuclear damage, its nuclear 
liability law, scilicet, the Price-Anderson Act is based upon a State liability 
regime.”53 Nevertheless, the legislator’s pursuit per se to construe the Act does 
not necessarily verify the fact that the Act intended to establish and introduce 
the term and doctrine of State liability. 
 
4.2. The Pre-Chernobyl-period, the 1986 Chernobyl accident and its 
  consequences in the nuclear liability regime 
 
Preceding 1986, no real experience of a nuclear accident with relevant trans-
boundary effects was available to urge the States to consider (or reconsider) 
the relevant issues of responsibility regimes in the examined field. In the 
1960s, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a draft multilateral agreement on 
emergency assistance, but this initiative was deemed to be unfeasible. It must be 
mentioned that at that time neither the 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party 
Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (hereinafter: Paris Convention), nor 
the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (here-
inafter: 1963 Vienna Convention) was in effect.54 Thus, before 1968 (when the 
Paris Convention entered into force) no relevant multilateral instrument 
governing problems of nuclear law obtained with special regard to the issues 
of responsibility and liability.  
 The Paris Convention was the first international instrument dealing with 
nuclear (third party) liability involving exclusively Western states within the 
framework of the OECD. Whereas, the Vienna Convention was open for 
accession by all States, but worldwide adherence was not achieved (it is a 
thought-provoking fact that its entry into force took 14 years, although, only 5 
ratifications were required). 
 Subsequently to the entry into force of both the Paris Convention and the 
Vienna Convention, a nuclear accident intrigued the attention of the inter-
national community. After the 1979 Three-Mile Island accident in Pennsylvania, 
USA (without human victims) the intention to cooperate on an international 
  
 53 See de la Fayette: op. cit. 24. 
 54 The Paris Convention entered into force in 1 April 1968, while the 1963 Vienna 
Convention entered into force in 12 November 1977. 
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level remarkably increased,55 but no significant breakthrough (in comparison 
with the aftermath of the 1986 Chernobyl accident) ensued.  
 As a matter of fact, it was the 1986 Chernobyl accident with its trans-
boundary consequences56 that highlighted most of the defects in law in the 
concurrent effective international instruments and therefore alerted the inter-
national community to finally arrive at an understanding of the need to reinforce 
the international framework of regulations, so that the consequences of nuclear 
accidents via timely and adequate compensation could be mitigated. 
 The Chernobyl disaster demonstrated the fact that a nuclear accident may 
cause unprecedented damage of an extreme dimension, that damage may be 
caused in regions far beyond the territory of the installation State and that in 
addition to inevitable transboundary damage to individuals, property and to the 
environment irrespective of borders, to the member States of the Paris and the 
Vienna Conventions, as well. Owing to the well-known fact that the former 
Soviet Union (the installation State) was not a Party to either   of the respective 
Conventions, the issues of due reparation mechanisms in line with issues of 
responsibility and/or liability were disregarded. Nonetheless, it has to be 
mentioned that both liability regimes set the upper limit of the operator’s 
liability at 5 million USD, thus, in case we assume that the Soviet Union would 
have been a Party to either of the liability regimes, the contingent amount of 
compensation would have been insignificant, bearing the considerable value of 
harmful transboundary effects in mind. 
 The awakening of international concern (as a result of the aftermaths of the 
Chernobyl accident) within the framework of the IAEA and other organisa-
tions foreshadowed the impending reform of the nuclear liability regime. Two 
issues were raised promptly after the Chernobyl disaster: firstly, the requirement 
of the wide international recognition of the nuclear liability regime, secondly, 
  
 55 On the purposes arising after the Three Mile Island accident, see Rautenbach, J.–
Tonhauser, W.–Wetherall, A.: Overview of the International Legal Framework Governing 
the Safe and Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy–Some Practical Steps. In: International 
Nuclear Law in the Post-Chernobyl Period. Paris, 2006. 7–36. 
 56 The accident had serious detrimental effects upon human health, property and the 
natural environment and damage was suffered in several neighbouring countries and in 
some cases, far beyond. See Schwartz, J.: International Nuclear Third Party Liability Law: 
The Response to Chernobyl. In: International Nuclear Law in the Post-Chernobyl Period. 
op. cit. 37.  
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the imperative to make the regime adequate to cope with the transboundary 
consequences of a grave nuclear accident.57 
 Finally, after the Chernobyl accident, the requirement of the provision of 
supplementary funding at an international level aroused renewed concern. At 
that time, it was deemed imperative to establish a new international instrument 
of State liability for transboundary damage, which complemented civil liability 
Conventions and provided a framework for a comprehensive nuclear liability 
regime.58 
 
4.3. State liability vs. civil liability 
 
From a highly general viewpoint, State liability consists in a liability for 
damages caused to another State according to international law, while civil 
liability implies the liability of a natural or legal entity for damages caused to 
another natural or legal entity on grounds of national law.  
 The concerned regimes basically converge, since ‘State liability’ arises from 
transboundary effects, which create inter-states legal relations, in which the 
rules pursuant to special, supplementary principles and provisions differ from 
the rules of civil liability regimes based upon the distinction between State and 
civil liability. For instance, civil liability regimes are divided into separate 
branches pursuant to the classification of liability, whereas, within the scope of 
(residual) State liability, similar classification is considered to be redundant (en 
passant, the so-called vicarious liability could be mentioned in re State 
liability). 
 This can be substantiated by the role of public international law within the 
domain State liability, as opposed to the role of the civil law regime in the 
domain of civil liability. While civil law, as a rule, distinguishes various forms 
of liability (the classification derives from the character of civil law), public 
international law establishes merely two categories (responsibility and liability, 
in the regimes of which no further divisions obtain, since even this separation 
is ambiguous). 
 The problem in 1961 consisted in answering the question of “who shall 
bear the loss in the event of harm”, which was fundamental to all questions of 
responsibility. On a national level four entities could be made accountable: the 
manufacturer or supplier, the operator, the State and members of the general 
  
 57 Cf. The 1997 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the 
1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage–Explanatory Texts. 
IAEA International Law Series No. 3, Vienna, 2007. 17. 
 58 See ibid. 62. 
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public who incurred the injury.59 Currently, international legal instruments almost 
exclusively set out from the generally accepted approach of the operator’s 
absolute liability (civil liability) pursuant to effective nuclear liability Conventions, 
which regulate liability in respect of third parties under international law, since 
the regulation is conceptually analogous to liability for activities involving 
increased danger under national laws of States.60  
 However, after the 1986 Chernobyl accident, it was indisputable that the 
civil liability regime was seriously deficient and needed rectification and that 
States needed to make a public commitment to nuclear safety including the 
prevention of accidents and the mitigation of consequences.61 The system of 
civil liability abounded in fundamental flaws, therefore framing a new Conven-
tion on State responsibility for nuclear activities was inevitable, with special 
regard to safety, accident prevention and response to emergency. 
 The fundamental underlying idea of the subsequent regulatory work derived 
from the general recognition that exclusively sufficient financial resources 
made available for the State could ensure the compensation of victims of an 
accident of such a scale.62 Although, law-making was committed to the 
aforementioned recognition, the final outcome of the debates consisted in the 
rejection of an express State liability regime, instead, the civil liability regime 
was reinforced via resources from the States, which were channelled to public 
funds.63 That mechanism underlay the 1997 Protocol to Amend the Vienna 
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (see, Paragraph 2 of Article 7 
of the Protocol) but, of course, that step could not even mean the express 
acceptance of the term of ‘State liability’ in lieu of the prevalent civil liability. 
 The objective of ensuring compensation from the resources of States (in re 
the residual amount that could not be covered by the operator’s limited amount) 
is formulated under Compensation Conventions (see, Amendments of the 1963 
Brussels Supplementary Convention to the Paris Convention and the 1997 
Convention on Supplementary Compensation). That also implies the expectation 
of the submission of uniform claims based on the so-called three compensation 
tiers (mainly in the context of 1963 Brussels Supplementary Convention, see, 
  
 59 Cf. Hardy: ibid. 747. 
 60 See Lamm, V.: The Reform of the Nuclear Liability Regime. Acta Juridica Hungarica 
40 (1999), 173. 
 61 See de la Fayette: op. cit. 7. 
 62 Cf. Lamm: op. cit. 174. 
 63 See ibid. 
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Paragraph b) of Article 3).64 Nevertheless, the three-level mechanism discussed 
hereinafter (with special regard to the third tier) does not invoke the term of 
‘State liability’, but it is considered as a first step taken in the direction of 
the process aiming to restrict the operator’s absolute liability and to simulta-
neously increase the role of state liability.  
 
4.4. The concept of liability under the regime of the Paris Convention (‘Paris 
  regime’) 
 
In the event a nuclear accident supervenes in the territory of a State Party to 
the Paris Convention and damage or loss is unanimously caused in another 
State, which is also a Party to Paris Convention, the provisions of the Paris 
Convention will be applicable. 
 According to Articles 3, 4 and 5, the Paris Convention establishes the 
maximum liability of the operator irrespective of the commission of an error, 
the liability for compensation shall be covered by insurance or other financial 
security, while “no other person shall be liable for damage caused by a 
nuclear incident” as Article 6 provides. Subsequently, the term of State liability 
has been excluded from its domain, therefore, the Paris Convention should be 
ignored in our discussion by reason of the establishment of the operator’s 
liability in the general scope of the Convention (entirely civil liability regime). 
As to proof of this characterization, liability under the Paris Convention is 
channelled to the operator of the specific nuclear installation, with no regard 
to whether causality obtains between the cause as the operator’s fault and the 
damage. So that these strict and financially effective rules pertaining to the 
operator’s liability are counterbalanced, the focal and substantial provisions of 
the liability regime stipulate time limitation for the submission of claims and 
limitation of the amount of liability, which narrow the scope of the absolute 
liability of the operator. 
 Within the purview of the Paris Convention, the rudimentary purpose was 
the ensure that in the event of a nuclear accident in a State, adequate compen-
sation shall be made available for victims in the Installation State as well as in 
affected States. That mechanism does by no means demonstrate the tangible 
duty or obligation of States, however, States have assumed responsibility to 
establish an adequate legal regime (in accord with the norms of international 
  
 64 Cf. Dussart-Desart, R.: The Reform of the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability 
in the Field of Nuclear Energy, and of the Brussels Supplementary Convention: an Overview 
of the Main Features of the Modernisation of the Two Conventions. In: International 
Nuclear Law in the Post-Chernobyl Period. op. cit. 21, 27, 30. 
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law) by means of the stipulation of the availability of compensation for victims 
residing within and outside the territory of the Installation State. 
 The Paris Convention per se does not contain provisions from which the 
later codified conception of State liability could be generated. 
 
4.4.1. The Brussels Supplementary Convention 
 
The Paris Convention that stipulated the operator’s absolute liability has been 
amended three times (by Protocols adopted in 1964,65 198266 and 200467), but 
the Parties had realised already before the first amending Protocol that the 
system of civil liability cannot be rectified via a mere revision of the effective 
nuclear liability law.68 
 As a result of the efforts to make the amounts of compensation for liability 
of operators proportionate to the scale of the consequences of nuclear incidents, 
many of the members of the Paris Convention adopted the 1963 Brussels 
Supplementary Convention, an international instrument that functions in full 
compliance with the Paris Convention via securing public funds for the 
compensation of victims, in case the amounts determined and claimed under 
the latter instrument are insufficient. Thus, within the purview of the Brussels 
Supplementary Convention, State liability is incorporated into the liability regime 
governed by the Paris Convention, because the Signatories of the Brussels Sup-
plementary Convention69 recognised that the liability of the operator limited in 
time and the amount of compensation under the Paris Convention would not be 
adequate. 
 The pivotal novelty of this instrument is the tier-based funding mechanism, 
which supplements the operator’s absolute legal liability with financial measures 
based on external resources, which entails the liability of the State(s) to 
guarantee the availability of these resources. This system operates as follows: 
 a) The first tier determines the operator’s maximum financial liability, so 
that compensation claims are covered by insurance or other financial 
security according to the operator’s limited compensation amount. 
 b) The second tier requires the Installation State, in the territory of which 
the operator of the concerned nuclear power plant is situated, to make 
public funds available under national law. Thus, at the level of the second 
  
 65 1960 Convention and the 1964 Protocol entered into force on 1 April 1968. 
 66 The 1982 Protocol entered into force on 7 October 1988. 
 67 The 2004 Protocol has not yet entered into force. 
 68 Cf. de la Fayette: op. cit. 7. 
 69 Signed by 13 states bound by the Paris Convention (16 states). 
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tier under an unlimited legal liability regime, the amount of compen-
sation supplied by the operator will be supplemented by public funds 
secured by the Contracting Party.  
 c) The third tier draws on international public funds made available by the 
States pursuant to Para. b) of Article 3 and Article 12 of the Brussels 
Supplementary Convention. The three-tier mechanism imposes absolute 
legal liability on the operator, which means that no demonstration of a 
fault or negligence is necessary, therefore, no instrument concerns the 
exclusive liability of States in the scope of nuclear law, but exclusive 
jurisdiction is granted to courts of the Installation State. 
 
 Hence, under the Paris-Brussels system, if the amount of the operator’s 
liability does not cover all the damage or the amount at the operator’s disposal 
is not sufficient for the full-scale compensation as a consequence of the 
absolute liability of the operator, firstly, the Installation State, secondly, all 
the Contracting Parties contribute certain amounts up to a fixed limit according 
to the three-tier compensation scheme, nevertheless, the insurance or the 
financial security of the operator has prior obligations.70 
 
4.5. The concept of State liability under the regime of the Vienna 
  Convention (‘Vienna regime’) 
  
As far as the Vienna Convention is concerned, the conceptual basis governing 
the Vienna and Paris Conventions is identical,71 since the fundamental and 
crucial principles coincide. As to the framework of these liability Conventions, 
both are based on four central pillars, namely, on the absolute liability of the 
operator of a nuclear installation (Article IV), on channelling exclusive 
liability (Article II), on the limitation of liability in amount and time (Articles 
V and VI) and on the establishment of the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts 
of the Installation State (Articles XI and XII). 
 
  
 70 Cf. Dussart-Desart: op. cit. 14. 
 71 After 1986 Chernobyl accident, there had been adopted a Joint Protocol Relating to 
the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention, in 1988, relating to 
the Paris and Vienna Conventions for the sake of establishing “a link between the Vienna 
Convention and the Paris Convention by mutually extending the benefit of the special 
regime of civil liability for nuclear damage set forth under each Convention and to 
eliminate conflicts arising from the simultaneous applications of both Conventions to a 
nuclear incident.” See the Preamble of the Joint Protocol.  
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4.5.1. The 1988 Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna and 
Paris Conventions on Liability for Nuclear Damage 
 
In view of the problems deriving from the 1986 Chernobyl accident, the gaps in 
the regulation became manifest. It was generally accepted by the Contracting 
Parties either to the Paris or to the Vienna Convention that an urgent revision 
of the instruments of nuclear liability was imperative. Several States submitted 
proposals for framing a new Convention on State liability for damage arising 
from nuclear incidents, but the clarification of the relationship between civil 
and state liability was thwarted by some States that refused to assume 
responsibility for transboundary harm caused by nuclear facilities under their 
jurisdiction or control.72 
 Consequently, the Paris and Vienna Conventions were designed to be 
linked by a de lege ferenda instrument, which uniformly formulated the legal 
regime of nuclear liability,73 however, upon the actual adoption of the 1988 
Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and Paris 
Conventions, the doctrine of de lege lata was applied.  
 The Joint Protocol, which is based upon the operator’s absolute liability in 
a similar manner to the liability Conventions forming the basis of the Joint 
Protocol, links the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention (encompassing 
both Conventions, so as to create a rectified liability regime) for the purpose of 
ensuring that the benefits of one Convention were extended to the Parties to 
the other Convention. Moreover, the problems arising from the differences 
between the two regimes were designed to be solved according to the Preamble 
of the Joint Protocol. As the final clause of the Preamble spells out,  
 
“The Contracting Parties desirous to establish a link between the Vienna 
Convention and the Paris Convention by mutually extending the benefit of 
the special regime of civil liability for nuclear damage set forth under each 
Convention and to eliminate conflicts arising from the simultaneous 
applications of both Conventions to a nuclear incident.” 
 
 Accordingly, the possible conflict arising from the simultaneous applications 
of these Conventions implied no longer a problem pursuant to Articles II and 
  
 72 Cf. de la Fayette: op. cit. 8. 
 73 Recognizing the fact, that “the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention are 
similar in substance and that no State is at present a Party to both Conventions”, as it reads 
in the Preamble. 
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III of the Joint Protocol.74 Under Article II: “The operator of a nuclear 
installation situated in the territory of a Party to the Vienna Convention shall 
be liable in accordance with that Convention for nuclear damage suffered in 
the territory of a Party to both the Paris Convention and this Protocol”, and 
vice versa mutatis mutandis. Consequently, the Parties to the Paris Convention 
and to the Joint Protocol are no longer regarded as non-member States within 
the purview of the Vienna Convention, furthermore, they are mutually 
regarded as Contracting Parties, whenever the operative provisions of either 
Convention are applicable and both Parties may claim compensation, if the 
States affected by the incident are Parties to the Joint Protocol. 
 Therefore, the Joint Protocol provides the legal basis for eliminating the 
difficulties and impediments arising from the two distinct legal regimes and 
can extinguish the contradictions between the effects of the two liability 
Conventions.  
 
4.5.2. The 1997 Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention 
 
While the Paris Convention was adopted as the first instrument that incorporated 
elements of the nuclear liability of States (the 1963 Brussels Supplementary 
Convention and the Paris Convention entered into force in the same year), it 
persisted as an operative instrument with an increasing number of acceding 
States, since its amendments followed the changing circumstances. The Vienna 
regime, scilicet, the Vienna Convention, however, entered into force 14 years 
after its formulation, which entailed prospective anomalies by reason of the 
long interval between its codification and taking effect. This fact and the 
relatively low number of Parties to the Vienna Convention prompted the 
international community to amend the Vienna Convention, in order to respond 
the technological developments achieved by that time and to eliminate the 
deficiencies of regulation emerging mainly after the Chernobyl disaster. 
 After the signature of the 1988 Joint Protocol (in 1988), the IAEA Working 
Group was set up (in 1989 for the purposes of the examination and revision of 
the civil liability regimes) simultaneously with the IAEA Standing Committee 
on Liability for Nuclear Damage with the comprehensive mandate to revise the 
  
 74 According to the Article III of the Joint Protocol: „either the Vienna Convention or 
the Paris Convention shall apply to a nuclear incident to the exclusion of the other.” On 
the number of remaining differences between the two conventions, cf. von Busekist, O.: A 
Bridge Between Two Conventions on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage: the Joint 
Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention. 
In: International Nuclear Law in the Post-Chernobyl Period. op. cit. 131. 
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regime of international liability for nuclear damage, including international civil 
liability, international State liability and the relationship between international 
civil and State liability.75  
 In 1997, the large majority of States (although, its membership is considerably 
restricted) adopted the Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil 
Liability for Nuclear Damage (hereinafter: Protocol).76 International initiatives 
designated to supplement and revise the Vienna Convention in a broader scope 
aimed to attain three main objectives: as the requirement of more compensa-
tion for damage (cf., Para. 2 of Article 2 extended the content of nuclear damage, 
which was one of the most desired novelty), more money to compensate victims 
(the redefinition of nuclear damage reflected the intention to secure full 
compensation for victims), of more people entitled to compensation (due to the 
revised concept of nuclear damage, more entities can claim compensation for 
the injuries and damages caused by nuclear incidents).77 
 The other milestone revision by the Protocol setting the possible limit of 
the operator’s liability at not less than 300 million SDRs (Paragraph 1 of Article 
7), but not less than 150 million SDRs provided that in excess of that amount 
and up to at least 300 million SDRs public funds shall be made available by 
that state to compensate nuclear damage (unambiguously, the exceeding of the 
traditional approach of strict civil liability represented by e.g. the Vienna 
Convention).  
 Similarly, the Protocol revised the provisions of the Vienna Convention on 
the time limit for submission of claims for nuclear damage; 30 years from the 
date of the nuclear incident for compensation for loss of life and personal 
injury, while the time limit concerning the other types of damages remained 
unamanded (10 years from the date of the nuclear incident).78 
 Since the Vienna regime was substantially revised in 1997, the problematic 
anomalies no longer influenced the behaviour of states in the intentional non-
attendance from this regime. Thus, future prospects on the basis of the newly 
formulated Vienna regime as amended by the Protocol held out the promise to 
manage to settle the controversial questions. 
 
  
 75 Cf. Lamm: op. cit. 170. 
 76 On general remarks and contributions as well as differences of the Protocol, during 
the phase of regulation in line with Vienna Convention, see further Lamm: op. cit. 172–
175.  
 77 See in details Schwartz: International Nuclear Third Party Liability Law… 46–57. 
 78 Article 8 Para. 1. 
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4.5.3. The 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage 
 
The Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (herein-
after CSC) had been adopted in 1997 under the auspices of the IAEA (chiefly 
due to the efficacious support of the United States), simultaneously with the 
Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention (discussed above).79 Albeit, the CSC–
not yet in force–is freestanding80 with respect to other liability conventions, 
according to its Article XVIII Paragraph 1, firstly an instrument of ratification, 
acceptance or approval shall be accepted only from a State which is a Party to 
either the Vienna Convention or the Paris Convention, or secondly, from a 
State which declares that its national law complies with the provisions of the 
Annex to this Convention. 
 The CSC oversteps the generally accepted priority relating to the exclusive 
and absolute liability of the operator by means of providing for additional 
compensation out of international public funds in excess of the operator’s 
liability limit amount.81 Adopting the CSC, a state must bind oneself to enact 
laws for guaranteeing the availability of compensation amounts as a result of 
transboundary damages caused by states to be a contracting party to the CSC 
and if the installation state would establish international public funds (with about 
600 million SDRs of which 150 million SDRs shall be reserved exclusively for 
transboundary damages).82  
 The CSC regulates, similarly to the Brussels Supplementary Convention, 
the tier-based system, with the difference that the first (private insurance) and 
second (member countries contribution) tier of compensation have been 
established by the CSC (Article III), while the CSC does not govern the 
distribution of the third tier. 
 The provisions of CSC incorporated into Article 5 of the Annex serve a 
double purpose. On the one hand, they ensure the availability of state funds for 
compensation of nuclear damage (pursuant to the mechanism written in the 
previous paragraph), which is to the benefit of victims. On the other hand, CSC 
  
 79 On the CSC in details, see McRae, B.: The Compensation Convention: Path to a 
Global Regime for Dealing with Legal Liability and Compensation for Nuclear Damage. 
In: International Nuclear Law in the Post-Chernobyl Period. op. cit. 187–200. 
 80 On its relevance, see ibid. 188. 
 81 While the CSC is consistent with the basic principles of nuclear liability law set forth 
in the Paris and Vienna regime in consideration with the keystone regulation system 
(channelling liability to the operator, imposing absolute liability, granting exclusive juris-
diction, limiting liability in amount and in time) of them. 
 82 See further McRae: op. cit. 191–193. 
 THE CONCEPTS OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY IN NUCLEAR LAW 249 
  
protects the operator against ruinous claims, as well. This so-called principle of 
congruence between liability and coverage is one of the internationally agreed 
pillars of nuclear liability law83 in which the primary liability of operator and 
subsidiary liability of state have been appeared. The adoption of CSC has been 
motivated by the recognition of the essential importance of the measures 
provided in the liability conventions as well as in national legislation on 
compensation for nuclear damage consistent with the principles of the liability 
conventions (cf. Preamble of the CSC). 
 Recognizing the fact, if a nuclear accident or a radiological emergency 
occurs in the territory of a CSC member state causing transboundary damages 
and losses, and the amount of damages exceeds the limit amount of the absolute 
responsible operator, the claims for damages shall have been compensated 
from international public funds ensured by the CSC member state. So, the 
liability of the installation state is subsidiary as a consequence of the absolute 
liability of the operator that extends to provide for the exceeding amount 
exclusively irrespective of the fault or negligence to be attributable to the state 
and without dealing the possible liable state manner. In this case, the state’s 
duty for compensation is, as a matter of fact, absolute but not under the 
provisions of the CSC, furthermore not exclusive and not full-scale (for the 
reason that the fund provides for amounts to compensate damages exceeding 
the maximum liability amount and the limited time period of the operator’s 
liability) as it has been basically determined in Article 15.  
  
4.6. Attempts relating to codify the rules on state liability (with special regard 
  to the concepts of state liability in the nuclear field) 
  
In the 1970s and 1980s, in the midst of the ILC’s activities related to elabora-
tion of the notion of state responsibility by giving its expression to establish 
a new topic of International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out 
of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law,84 and furthermore, in the Pre-
liminary Report on that theme prepared to 1985, the ILC divided the topic of 
  
 83 Pelzer, N.: International Pooling of Operators’ Funds: An Option to Increase the 
Amount of Financial Security to Cover Nuclear Liability. Discussion Paper for the IAEA 
INLEX Group Meeting on 21–22 June 2007. 2. 
 84 See Yearbook of International Law Commission. New York, 1985. 1–143.  
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liability into the issues of the prevention of transboundary harm from hazardous 
activities, and of liability for injurious consequences.85    
 The 1985 Preliminary Report of the ILC found that “past trends demonstrate 
that states have been held liable for injuries caused to other states and their 
nationals as a result of activities occurring within their territorial jurisdiction or 
under their control.”86 According to the same Paragraph, the concept of 
absolute and strict liability of operators (license holders) based upon the most 
instruments dealing with nuclear liability issues (especially Paris and Vienna 
Convention), had been damaged due to a pivotal provision of the Preliminary 
Report which reads as follows: “even treaties imposing liability on the operators 
of activities have not in all cases exempted states from liability.”87 
 Seeing that, several multilateral conventions impose certain responsibilities 
upon the state in order to ensure that the liable operators abide by the conven-
tions containing relative rules. And, if a state fails to do that required activity, 
it is held liable for the injuries the operator causes. This kind of channelling 
method transforming operator’s liability to residual liability of states serves as 
a basis for recognizing and promoting the concept of state liability. 
 Two years later, ILC published its Third Report (Second Report prepared to 
1986) on the aforementioned subject taking serious steps towards a compre-
hensive liability regime by means of defining the term ‘liability’ but without 
the explicit usage of term ‘state liability’. No phrase of ‘state liability’ occurs in 
the text of the Report pointing ahead the subsidiary role of that in comparison 
with the primary private (civil as operator or license holder) liability.  
 Also, for that reason the IAEA Board of Governors decided to set up the 
Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage in 1990. It was expressly 
requested to consider international liability for nuclear damage, including inter-
national civil liability, international state liability and the relationship between 
international civil and state liability.  
 The work on regulating state liability has soon concentrated on the one hand, 
on the revision of the Vienna Convention and, on the other hand, on the establish-
ment of a system of supplementary funding. At least, no general agreement has 
been accepted on the basis of the Committee’s work, especially in view of 
regulation concerning state liability regime. During the discussions on the 
  
 85 Cf. Rao, S. P.: First report on the legal regime for allocation of loss in case of 
transboundary harms arising out of hazardous activities. UN Doc. A/CN.4/532 (21 March 
2003) Para. 33. 
 86 See Yearbook of International Law Commission. op. cit. 94. 
 87 Cf. ibid. 
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coherency between state and civil liability, several options were considered 
by the Commission for the sake of giving rise to some form of reparation. 
 Until 1997, within the scope of nuclear liability regime, two main instruments 
had governed the liability regulation operating under the auspices of the IAEA 
(Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damages) and OECD (Paris 
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy) that 
involved the complexity of liability rules with the problem of the separate 
(Paris and Vienna) mechanisms incorporated into the conventions dealing with 
the similar questions but in significantly different level. Furthermore, the state 
participation is different in the relation of the two conventions, because Paris 
Convention had been signed by a group of states of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, whereas the Vienna Convention was 
intended to regulate the related issues on a worldwide scale.88 
 As opposed to the general acceptance of the operator’s absolute liability, 
similarly to the Paris and Vienna Convention combined by the provisions of 
the Joint Protocol, the commitment required from the states to create public 
funds is considered to be a special form of the appearance of the term ‘state 
liability’. But this term has not been incorporated into the expressed scope of 
the CSC because it lays the rules on compensation mechanisms down, in which 
making clear, that this instrument deals only with civil liability,89 so the concept 
of state liability has been unambiguously excluded from the text of the CSC. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
After the 1986 Chernobyl accident, scilicet, when the international community 
recognised that there was no effective (State) liability legal regime, attempts 
were made mainly within the scope of the competent body, namely, in the 
work of the IAEA. Nuclear accidents and radiological emergencies with 
transboundary effects causing increasingly serious damages reassessed the 
(almost exclusively civil) liability regime of that time.  
 The Vienna Convention imposes the obligation on the Installation State of 
guaranteeing compensation for victims that suffered nuclear damages due to 
nuclear accidents “which have been established against the operator by providing 
the necessary funds to the extent that the yield of insurance or other financial 
security is inadequate to satisfy such claims, but not in excess of the limit” 
(Paras. 1–2 of Article 9 of the Protocol to Amend the 1963 Vienna Convention).  
  
 88 See Lamm: op. cit. 170.  
 89 Cf. Article 15 of the CSC. 
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 Thereby, the ensuant transboundary effects of nuclear accidents demanded 
the review of nuclear law with special regard to the experiences that occurred 
in 1986 and to the fact of the inadequate regulation of liability (and/or 
responsibility). In the period after Chernobyl, it became unambiguous that a 
civil liability system (the Paris and Vienna regimes) based upon the primary 
liability of the operator cannot be maintained in itself by reason of the high 
amount of damages to be paid for the victims of an accident or emergency 
involving transboundary effects. 
 The purpose of the subsequent regulation has been to eliminate these 
problems by means of establishing public funds, extending limitation periods, 
clarifying the main rules concerning issues of jurisdiction, etc. These objectives 
have been manifest in initiatives aimed at amending and reconceptualising the 
system of the Vienna Convention, which as an intention has been realised and 
are available as legal instruments in force or as drafts.90 
 Nevertheless, with reference to the prospective regulation, we have to 
observe de la Fayette’s apt remark, which reads as follows: “some States are 
willing to pay, but unwilling to admit they are liable to pay.”91 
 
 
 
 
  
 90 Julia Schwartz offers a survey of these instruments, cf. Schwartz: International 
Nuclear Third Party Liability Law… op. cit. 
 91 See de la Fayette: op. cit. 25. 
